“The Street Was One Place We Could Not Go”: The American Army and Urban Combat in World War II Europe

Much has been written about the nature of the United States Army in World War II and the topic of military effectiveness. This dissertation examines how the United States responded to a combat environment, specifically, fighting in built-up areas, that it had not planned to fight within before World War II. By following three infantry divisions, the 1st, 3rd, and 5th Infantry Divisions through their combat in World War II, this dissertation investigates how the Army of the United States fought within the urban setting to see whether the American Army improved and became more effective as the war continued. It argues that the 1st, 3rd, and 5th Infantry Divisions learned and became more proficient at urban combat over time. This dissertation asserts that as these divisions embraced combined-arms operations in general, that is, mastered the coordination of infantry weapons, armor, and artillery into battle, so they applied those lessons to the urban environment. Whereas the American military had neither doctrine nor tradition of urban combat before World War II, combat units learned to develop methods of fighting within towns and cities. Further, the United States Army processed and incorporated these battlefield lessons into military doctrine at a slower rate. The infantry divisions’ combat experience had a greater impact on army doctrine than the doctrine had on the divisions’ warfighting practices